






Seminar Paper No. 700 
 
DOES ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICY 



















   INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC STUDIES 
   Stockholm University 
 
  




Seminar Paper No. 700 
 
DOES ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICY WORK?  
LESSONS FROM THE SWEDISH EXPERIENCES 
 
by 











Papers in the seminar series are also published on internet  
in Adobe Acrobat (PDF) format.  
Download from http://www.iies.su.se/ 
 
Seminar Papers are preliminary material circulated to  
stimulate discussion and critical comment. 
 
January 2002 
Institute for International Economic Studies 
  S-106 91 Stockholm 
 Sweden       1 









The Swedish experiences of the 1990s provide a unique example of how large-scale 
active labour market programmes (ALMPs) have been used as a means to fight high 
unemployment. This paper discusses the mechanisms through which ALMPs affect 
(un)employment and surveys the empirical studies of the effects of ALMPs in Swe-
den. The main conclusions are: (i) there is hardly any evidence for a positive effect on 
matching efficiency; (ii) there are some indications of positive effects on labour force 
participation; (iii) subsidised employment seems to cause displacement of regular 
employment, whereas this appears not to be the case for labour market training; (iv) it 
is unclear whether or not ALMPs raise aggregate wage pressure in the economy; (v) 
in the 1990s, training programmes seem not to have enhanced the employment prob-
abilities of participants, whereas some forms of subsidised employment seem to have 
had such effects; and (vi) youth programmes seem to have caused substantial dis-
placement effects at the same time as the gains for participants appear uncertain.  
On the whole, ALMPs have probably reduced open unemployment, but also re-
duced regular employment. The overall policy conclusion is that ALMPs of the scale 
used in Sweden in the 1990s are not an efficient means of employment policy. To be 
effective, ALMPs should be used on a smaller scale. There should be a greater em-
phasis on holding down long-term unemployment in general and a smaller emphasis 
on youth programmes. ALMPs should not be used as a means to renew unemploy-
ment benefit eligibility. 
                                                 
♠ Lars Calmfors is professor of international economics at the Institute for International Economic Studies, 
Stockholm University. Anders Forslund is a senior research fellow and deputy director of IFAU (the Swedish 
Office of Labour Market Policy Evaluation). Maria Hemström is a senior research fellow at IFAU.   2 
Does active labour market policy work? Les-
sons from the Swedish experiences
♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ 
During the last decade there has been an increasing international interest in active 
labour market policies, i.e. measures to raise employment that are directly targeted at 
the unemployed. According to conventional definitions, these policies comprise: (i) 
job broking activities with the aim of improving the matching between vacancies and 
unemployed; (ii) labour market training; and (iii) job creation (subsidised employ-
ment). Recommendations to expand the use of these policies have become standard 
from international bodies, such as the OECD and the EU Commission (e.g. OECD, 
1994; European Commission, 2000). In the EU, the European Council agreed in 1997 
on an employment strategy that includes active labour market policy as a key ingredi-
ent,
1 and many member states have followed these recommendations.
2 
The recent interest in active labour market policies motivates a thorough evalua-
tion of how successful the active labour market programmes (henceforth denoted 
ALMPs) in various countries have been. Sweden is then a case of particular interest, 
as this is the country where the focus on active labour market policy has been the 
greatest. Partly this reflects an old tradition, partly it was the response to a sudden and 
steep increase in unemployment in the early 1990s. At their peak in 1994, ALMPs in 
Sweden encompassed more than 5 per cent of the labour force and expenditures ac-
counted for more than 3 per cent of GDP. 
The Swedish case is interesting from the point of view of evaluation because a 
large number of studies of the effects of ALMPs have been made. Recent studies have 
been able to draw on an internationally unique data material: the National Labour 
Market Board (AMS) provides a longitudinal data set with the event history of all 
unemployed individuals registered at the public employment offices since 1991. This 
makes it possible to trace the effects of participation in ALMPs for a very large num-
ber of persons over long periods. The Swedish experiences are of great interest also 
because they illustrate clearly the interdependence between ”passive” unemployment 
                                                 
♣ Previous versions of the paper have been discussed at a public seminar on November 16, 2000 in Stockholm, 
at the CESifo conference “Labour market institutions and public regulation” on October 26/27 2001 in Munich, 
and at academic seminars at the Office of Labour Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU) and the Swedish Institute for 
Social Research, Stockholm University (SOFI). The authors are particularly grateful for comments on previous 
versions from Jonas Agell, Susanne Ackum Agell, Jim Albrecht, Dan Andersson, Per-Anders Edin, Bertil Holm-
lund, Per Johansson, Katarina Richardson, Karl-Martin Sjöstrand, and Johnny Zetterberg. 
1 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/elm/summit/en/papers/guide2.htm. 
2 This is evident from the national action plans on employment. The plans for 2001 are available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/news/2001/may/naps2001_en.html.   3 
support and ”active” measures, which has been the subject of much recent policy dis-
cussion (see e.g. European Commission, 2000). 
This paper surveys the evidence on the employment effects of Swedish active la-
bour market policy. The focus is on how ALMPs affect regular employment, i.e. em-
ployment excluding participation in programmes. The motivation for this focus is that 
employment generation is widely considered to be the primary aim of active labour 
market policy, even though there are also other goals, such as social-policy aims of 
mitigating the consequences of open unemployment and contributing to a more even 
income distribution, as well as additional macroeconomic aims of, for example, rais-
ing productivity growth. The results from studies of Sweden will be compared with 
the evidence from macroeconomic studies based on cross-country or panel data for 
the OECD countries. Such a comparison is highly relevant, because the latter studies, 
originating with Layard et al. (1991), have usually been interpreted to give strong 
empirical support for the effectiveness of active labour market policy as a means of 
raising employment. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 gives a background picture of how 
ALMPs have been used in Sweden. Section 2 identifies a number of theoretical 
mechanisms. Section 3 surveys Swedish microeconometric studies of the effects on 
the individuals participating in ALMPs, and Section 4 surveys Swedish macroeco-
nomic studies of the general-equilibrium effects. Section 5 reviews the studies based 
on cross-country or panel data for OECD countries. Section 6 sums up the results and 
draws policy conclusions. 
 
1  Active labour market policy in Sweden 
There is a long tradition of active labour market policy in Sweden. In the beginning of 
the 20
th century, municipal employment offices were built up (Thoursie, 1990). In the 
depressions of the inter-war years, the government organised relief works and special 
youth jobs. In 1948, the foundations of modern labour market policy were laid when 
the National Labour Market Board was instituted. 
 
1.1  The thinking behind labour market policy 
The thinking around Swedish labour market policy was, at least before the 1990s, 
guided mainly by the principles laid out by two trade union economists, Gösta Rehn   4 
and Rudolf Meidner, in the late 1940s and early 1950s.
3 They saw active labour mar-
ket policy as a necessary ingredient in a policy mix designed to combine low infla-
tion, full employment and wage compression. They worried that an anti-inflationary 
demand-management policy would cause unemployment in low-productivity sectors. 
To avoid that, they recommended labour market re-training and other mobility-
enhancing measures, so that workers threatened by unemployment in low-productivity 
sectors could be transferred to high-productivity sectors, relieving labour shortages 
there. 
The original focus in post-war Swedish labour market policy was thus on increas-
ing labour mobility. However, over time in the 1960-1990 period the emphasis gradu-
ally shifted in the direction of counteracting all types of unemployment. In the late 
1960s and early 1970s, the objective of eliminating remaining ”islands of unemploy-
ment” through selective job creation programmes became more important (Meidner, 
1969). Gradually, it also became a more important aim to hold down unemployment 
in general in recessions. This development seems to be explained by generally rising 
ambitions in employment policy (Lindbeck, 1975; Calmfors and Forslund, 1990). 
The motive of holding down open unemployment in general came to dominate 
completely in the 1990s. In the early 1990s, Sweden entered its deepest recession in 
the post-war period with regular employment falling by 13 per cent between 1990 and 
1994. In this situation, placement in ALMPs became the main short-run policy in-
strument to counteract the rise in open unemployment. Policy was also to a large ex-
tent guided by the social-policy objectives of providing income support for the unem-
ployed: formally, unemployment compensation could not be had for more than 14 
months for the majority of the work force, but eligibility could be renewed through 
participation in ALMPs. There is ample evidence that programme placements were 
systematically used to this end (e.g. Carling et al., 1996; Sianesi, 2001).  
An important side objective of Swedish active labour market policy has always 
been to mitigate the moral hazard problems of a generous unemployment insurance: 
by making payment of unemployment compensation conditional on accepting regular 
job offers or placement offers in ALMPs from the public employment offices, active 
labour market policy has been used as a work test for the recipients of unemployment 
compensation. 
                                                 
3 The main reference is Fackföreningsrörelsen och den fulla sysselsättningen (1951).   5 
 
1.2  The various programmes 
Originally, labour market training mainly consisted of vocational training program-
mes, but over time schemes containing more general education have become more 
important. In recent years, also education in Swedish for immigrants has formed part 
of labour market training. Computer activity centres, which were introduced in 1995, 
represent another innovation; in addition an IT program (Swit) was launched by the 
government in 1998 in cooperation with the Confederation of Swedish Industries. The 
duration of training programmes has usually been six months. Participants have recei-
ved training grants equivalent to unemployment compensation. From the second half 
of the 1980s, it became possible for unemployed individuals to requalify for unemp-
loyment compensation through participation in training programmes. In 2000, this 
possibility was abolished for all labour market programmes. 
There have been many types of subsidised employment schemes over the years. 
The classical measure has been relief works. They consisted of temporary jobs 
(around six months), which were usually arranged in the public sector, but to some 
extent also in the private sector, and where employers obtained a subsidy for employ-
ing individuals chosen by the public employment offices. The participants were paid 
wages according to collective agreements. Relief works were used up to 1998, when 
they were abolished. 
In the 1990s, relief works were largely replaced by so-called work experience 
schemes. These consisted of activities that ”would otherwise not have occurred” and 
were often arranged by various non-profit organisations. The aim was to organise 
activities that would not crowd out regular employment. Participants in work experi-
ence schemes received unemployment compensation. Recruitment subsidies and 
(more recently) employment subsidies are programmes that are more similar to regular 
employment. Both programmes have entailed wage subsidies to employers for hiring 
unemployed (mainly long-term unemployed). Participants have been paid regular 
wages according to collective agreements. 
Another type of subsidised employment is self-employment grants. These grants, 
which consist of unemployment benefits for up to six months, are given to unem-
ployed persons to start their own businesses after scrutiny by the employment offices. 
These have also arranged entrepreneurial training for the participants.   6 
Other programmes can be characterised as work practice programmes. In our sur-
vey of empirical results, we include these in job creation activities, but work practice 
programmes are supposed to have also a training content. Various types of youth 
schemes belong to this category The first youth programme was youth teams intro-
duced in 1984. They were followed by “schooling-in slots”. During 1992 youth prac-
tice was introduced. This programme rapidly reached large volumes. The programme 
was targeted at youth below the age of twenty-five. As was the case for work experi-
ence schemes, there were clear instructions to avoid displacement effects.  
Other examples of work practice programmes were practice for immigrants and 
practice for academic graduates, which were similar is spirit to youth practice, but 
with different target groups. Yet another work practice programme was work place-
ment schemes, which replaced practice for immigrants, practice for academic gradu-
ates and youth practice in 1995. 
Resource jobs were introduced in 1997 and entailed subsidies to employers for tempo-
rarily (six months with an option to prolong it by three months) hiring unemployed 
persons. The participants were mainly supposed to work, but were in addition suppo-
sed to take part in training and to actively search for jobs. The wage rate was capped 
at what roughly corresponds to 90 percent of the participant’s previous income. 
Trainee replacement schemes involved subsidies during at most six months to 
employers, who paid for training for an employee and hired a replacement (who re-
ceived a wage according to collective agreements). Hence, trainee replacement 
schemes can be classified as both training and job creation. 
The only programme that has been used over the entire period under study is la-
bour market training. All other programmes have either been instituted during the 
period and/or ended during it. Relief works were abandoned in 1998, recruitment sub-
sidies were used between 1981 and 1997, work experience schemes were used be-
tween 1993 and 1998, work placement schemes between 1995 and 1998, trainee re-
placement schemes between 1991 and 1997, resource jobs between 1997 and 1999, 
and practice for academic graduates and practice for immigrants between 1993 and 
1995. Self employment grants were introduced in 1984, youth programmes in 1984, 
computer activity centres in 1995, and employment subsidies in 1997. 
Finally, a reform took place in 2000, when an activity guarantee was introduced. 
This programme is targeted at persons who are or are at risk of becoming long-term 
unemployed (or, more precisely, long-term registered at the public employment ser-  7 
vice). Within the programme the participants are given some full-time activity, e.g. 
job search, until they find a job or enrol in regular education. This reform was made in 
connection with the abolishment of the earlier possibility to renew benefit eligibility 
by participating in ALMPs. 
 
1.3  The empirical picture 
Figures 1-3 illustrate how the programme volumes have developed over time.  
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Figure 1: Open unemployment and programme participation (shares of labour force), 1970 – 
2000 
Sources: Unemployment and labour force: Statistics Sweden, Labour Force Surveys; Programme par-
ticipation: The National Labour Market Board. 
 
Figure 1 shows open unemployment and total participation in ALMPs. The pic-
ture is one of a slow trend-wise growth in the size of ALMPs in the 1970s and 1980s, 
but there is also a cyclical pattern. The large expansion in the 1990s in connection 
with the steep rise in unemployment also stands out. Towards the end of the 1990s, 
when unemployment came down, the programme volumes were reduced again.  
Figure 2 depicts total unemployment (the sum of open unemployment and partici-
pation in ALMPs) and the accommodation ratio (the ratio between programme par-
ticipation and total unemployment). In the 1970s and 1980s, the accommodation ratio 
was of the order of magnitude of 0.4–0.5, but it fell in the 1990s. Although pro-
grammes expanded strongly then, they did not increase proportionally to the rise in 
unemployment. In 2000, the accommodation ratio was around 0.3.   8 
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Figure 2: The accommodation ratio and total unemployment, 1970 – 2000 
Notes: Total unemployment is defined as the sum of open unemployment and total participation in 
ALMPs. The accommodation ratio is defined as the ratio of programme participation to total unemp-
loyment. 
Sources: Participation in ALMPs: The National Labour Market Board; Unemployment and the labour 
force: Statistics Sweden. 
 
Figure 3 shows the development of various programme types. In the 1970s and 
1980s, training encompassed more persons than subsidised employment. The only 
exception was the recession in the first half of the 1980s. The steep increase in unem-
ployment in 1991-92 was first met by a large expansion of training programmes, but 
later there were large increases in schemes of subsidised employment and practice. 
Recently, training programmes have again become relatively more important. 
 














Figure 3: Participation in different kinds of labour market programmes, 1970 – 2000   9 
Note: The programmes are generally classified as in the main text. Trainee replacement schemes and 
resource jobs are classified as subsidised employment. 
Source: The National Labour Market Board.  
 
1.4  Swedish ALMPs in an international perspective 
Tables 1–3 provide an international perspective. Table 1 shows the expenditures on 
active labour market policy as a fraction of GDP. In both the 1986–90 and 1991–95 
periods, Sweden spent more on active labour market policy than any other country. 
The difference is especially marked in the 1991–95 period, when expenditures in 
Sweden amounted to 1.79 percent of GDP, one percentage point higher than the EU 
average. Expenditures in Sweden were reduced in 1996–99 when unemployment fell, 
but still amounted to as much as 1.14 percent of GDP, which was well above the EU 
and OECD averages. In this period, both Denmark and Finland, however, spent slight-
ly more on active labour market policy. 
 
Table 1: Expenditures on active labour market policies (percent of GDP)  
   1986–90 1991–95 1996–99 
Austria  0.26 0.28 0.36 
Belgium
a  1.06 0.99 1.12 
Denmark  0.82 1.15 1.21 
Finland  0.82 1.39 1.22 
France
a  0.50 0.85 1.04 
Germany  0.72 1.16 1.04 
Greece
b  0.16 0.23 0.23 
Ireland
c  1.06 0.70 1.37 
Italy -  0.89  0.66 
Luxembourg
b  0.16 0.12 0.18 
Netherlands  0.56 0.85 1.07 
Portugal
a  0.26 0.41 0.32 
Spain  0.71 0.59 0.48 
Sweden  1.10 1.79 1.14 
United Kingdom
a  0.50 0.38 0.26 
EU  average  0.62 0.79 0.78 
Austalia  0.25 0.45 0.48 
Canada  0.52 0.57 0.46 
Japan  0.09 0.10 0.10 
New  Zealand  0.81 0.77 0.60 
Norway  0.64 1.28 0.56 
Switzerland  0.08 0.18 0.51 
United  States  0.20 0.17 0.14 
OECD  average  0.54 0.70 0.66 
           
Notes: 
a Data available until 1998.
 b Data available until 1997.
 c Data available until 1996. 
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, various issues. 
   10 
Table 2 provides another illustration of the focus put in Sweden on ALMPs by re-
lating expenditures on them to the total expenditures on the unemployed (the sum of 
expenditures on active labour market policy and expenditures on unemployment bene-
fits and early retirement for labour market reasons). The table shows that Sweden had 
the largest share of active expenditures in 1986–90, when it was 59 percent, more than 
double the EU and OECD averages. The share subsequently fell, but remained 15–20 
percentage points above the EU and OECD averages. In 1991–95 and 1996–99, only 
Norway and Italy allocated larger shares of the unemployment expenditures on active 
measures than Sweden. 
  
Table 2: Expenditures on active labour market policies as a fraction of total unemployment 
expenditures 
  1986-90 1991-95  1996-1999 
Austria 0.21  0.18  0.22 
Belgium 0.27  0.26  0.30 
Denmark 0.17  0.19  0.25 
Finland 0.37  0.27  0.30 
France 0.20  0.30  0.36 
Germany 0.36  0.35  0.31 
Greece 0.29  0.34  0.33 
Ireland 0.26  0.29  0.36 
Italy -  0.47  0.47 
Luxembourg 0.17  0.16  0.21 
Netherlands 0.16  0.22  0.25 
Portugal 0.45  0.36  0.27 
Spain 0.22  0.17  0.10 
Sweden 0.59  0.47  0.42 
United Kingdom  0.26  0.22  0.20 
EU average  0.28  0.28  0.29 
Australia 0.19  0.21  0.28 
Canada 0.24  0.23  0.29 
Japan 0.22  0.27  0.19 
New Zealand  0.43  0.31  0.31 
Norway 0.52  0.72  0.52 
Switzerland 0.32  0.15  0.32 
United States  0.30  0.26  0.33 
OECD average  0.29  0.29  0.30 
Notes: 
a Data available until 1998.
 b Data available until 1997.
 c Data available until 1996. 
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, various issues. 
 
Table 3, finally, compares the allocation of expenditures on different programmes 
among countries for the whole 1986–99 period. What stands out here is the larger 
emphasis in Sweden than in most other countries on labour market training. 42 per-  11 
cent of the expenditures on ALMPs in Sweden have been on training, compared to 
EU and OECD averages of 27 and 29 percent, respectively. Only a few countries 
(New Zealand, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, and France) have spent larger 
fractions of active expenditures on training than Sweden. 
 
Table 3: The allocation of expenditures on active labour market policies in 1986–99 (the ex-
penditures on various programmes as shares of total expenditures on active labour market 
policy)  








Austria 0.41  0.38  0.05  0.17 
Belgium
a 0.19  0.14  0.00  0.67 
Denmark 0.10  0.47  0.21  0.22 
Finland 0.12  0.33  0.04  0.51 
France
a 0.20  0.43  0.12  0.24 
Germany 0.25  0.37  0.05  0.33 
Greece
b 0.45  0.08  0.03  0.44 
Ireland
c 0.15  0.26  0.23  0.35 
Italy
d 0.16  0.03  0.45  0.35 
Luxembourg
b 0.23  0.12  0.38  0.27 
Netherlands 0.31  0.45  0.05  0.20 
Portugal
a 0.34  0.10  0.28  0.28 
Spain 0.16  0.19  0.12  0.53 
Sweden 0.18  0.42  0.08  0.31 
United Kingdom
a 0.49 0.31  0.01  0.19 
EU average  0.25  0.27  0.14  0.34 
Australia 0.42  0.19  0.05  0.35 
Canada 0.40  0.49  0.04  0.08 
Japan
e 0.28  0.21  0.00  0.51 
New Zealand  0.19  0.50  0.03  0.29 
Norway 0.34  0.34  0.12  0.21 
Switzerland 0.65  0.21  0.00  0.14 
United States  0.39  0.37  0.18  0.06 
OECD average  0.29  0.29  0.11  0.30 
        
Notes: 
a Data available until 1998. 
b Data available until 1997. 
c Data available until 1996 
except years 1992-94. 
d Data missing for years 1989, 1993-95. 
e Data missing for years 1986-
87 
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, various issues. 
 
2  A theoretical framework 
ALMPs can have a number of effects on employment. Some of the effects are inten-
ded, whereas others are unintended. To sort them out, we use a modified version of   12 
the Layard et al. (1991) theoretical framework for analysing equilibrium real wages 
and unemployment, as set out by Calmfors (1994). 
In Figure 4 we distinguish between three curves. A downward-sloping employ-
ment schedule shows how regular labour demand (labour demand excluding participa-
tion in ALMPs) depends negatively on the real wage. An upward-sloping wage-
setting schedule shows how wage pressure depends positively on regular employ-
ment. (The underlying assumption is that higher regular employment is associated 
with a higher probability of finding a job if an employee is separated from his present 
job. This gives employees a better outside option when bargaining with the present 
employer, which makes it possible to obtain a higher wage.) The intersection of the 
two curves gives the equilibrium levels of real wages and regular employment. In 
addition, a vertical line shows the labour force. By deducting participation in ALMPs 
from the labour force, and comparing the outcome with regular employment, one ob-
tains open unemployment.  
Figure 4: Wage setting and employment 
 
The analytical framework in Figure 4 can be motivated in several ways. The sim-
plest possibility is to view the employment schedule as an ordinary stock demand for 
labour, following from the usual marginal productivity condition. The wage-setting 
schedule may be viewed as the (steady-state) outcome of either collective wage bar-
gaining or unilateral employer decisions on wages in an efficiency-wage framework. 
However, for some applications it is more worthwhile to see the employment sched-
ule as a (steady-state) reduced form derived from a framework where vacancies and 
Employment 
schedule 
Wage  -  setting 
schedule 
Labour   force 
Regular employment 
Real   wage   13 
unemployed need to be matched along the lines of Pissarides (1990) and Mortensen 
and Pissarides (1994). In this case, it is convenient to regard wage setting as the out-
come of agreements between employers and individual employees. 
With the help of the above framework, we shall analyse various effects of 
ALMPs. Following Calmfors (1994), we distinguish between: (i) effects on the 
matching process; (ii) effects on the competition for jobs; (iii) productivity effects; 
(iv) effects on the allocation of labour between sectors; (v) direct crowding-out effects 
on regular labour demand; and (vi) accommodation effects on wage setting. 
 
2.1  Effects on the matching process
4 
The aim of the job-broking and counselling activities for the unemployed by the pub-
lic employment offices is to make the matching process more efficient, i.e. to increase 
the number of successful matches at given numbers of vacancies and job seekers. This 
is often regarded as the primary function of active labour market policy. 
A more efficient matching process shifts the employment schedule in Figure 4 to 
the right, which tends to raise both employment and the real wage. The explanation is 
this. When deciding whether or not to post a vacancy, a firm compares the expected 
future revenues with the expected costs (hiring costs and future pay). The expected 
future revenues depend on how quickly the vacancy is expected to be filled. An in-
crease in matching efficiency increases the probability of filling a posted vacancy at 
any point of time. Hence, the expected return to posting vacancies increases, and 
therefore more vacancies are posted. This results in higher employment. 
An increase in matching efficiency also shifts the wage-setting schedule to the 
right, which works in the direction of reducing the real wage and increasing employ-
ment. The reason is the following. Each match creates a surplus to share between the 
firm and the employed job seeker. The sharing will depend on the outside options of 
the firm and the employee, i.e. their alternative opportunities if they cannot agree. In 
that case, the employee quits and becomes a job seeker again, and the firm posts a 
new vacancy. The firm can expect to fill such a vacancy the quicker, the higher is 
matching efficiency. It follows that the firm has a better bargaining position vis-à-vis 
the employee, the higher is matching efficiency. Hence, a higher matching efficiency 
                                                 
4 The exposition builds on Pissarides (1990), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), and Romer (1996), Ch. 10. See 
also Holmlund and Lindén (1993) and Fredriksson (1997) for direct applications to ALMPs.   14 
means that the firm is able to negotiate a lower real wage at each level of employ-
ment.
5 
As a higher matching efficiency will shift both the employment and wage-setting 
schedules to the right, this effect must increase employment, whereas the effect on the 
real wage is ambiguous. 
One should indeed expect active labour market policy in the form of job broking 
and counselling activities as well as completed labour market training to increase 
matching efficiency. This is the desired treatment effect. But there may also be a lock-
ing-in effect of training or job creation programmes working in the opposite direction 
if the participants do not exit from the programmes before they are completed. This 
effect tends instead to shift the employment and wage-setting schedules to the left. 
The consequence is then a tendency to lower regular employment (whereas the impact 
on the real wage is still unclear). Whether or not the treatment effect dominates the 
locking-in effect is an empirical issue.  
 
2.2  Effects on the competition for jobs 
Quite apart from their effect on matching efficiency, ALMPs may affect the degree of 
competition for the available jobs by making participants more competitive. This may 
result from several mechanisms (Layard et al., 1991; Nickell and Layard, 1999). Par-
ticipation in an ALMP may help to maintain the motivation to seek actively for work, 
i.e. counteract the discouraged-worker effect of unemployment. The competition for 
jobs is also stimulated if ALMPs help to preserve or increase the skills of the unemp-
loyed. And employers may in general perceive participants in ALMPs as more attrac-
tive than the openly unemployed. 
As a result, ALMPs may have a positive effect on labour force participation. In 
Figure 4, the labour supply schedule, showing the size of the work force, is then 
shifted to the right. The wage-setting schedule is also shifted to the right. The reason 
is that there are more workers competing for the same number of jobs: a given level of 
regular employment is thus associated with a lower job-finding probability, which 
worsens the outside option of employees in wage bargaining. The rightward shift of 
                                                 
5 One might think that an increase in matching efficiency should also have an effect working in the opposite di-
rection because it will enable a quitter to find a new job more quickly. This is not, however, the case if employ-
ment is held constant. The probability for a job seeker to find a new job equals the aggregate number of matches 
divided by the aggregate number of job seekers in the economy. In a steady state with given employment (and a 
given number of job seekers), the number of matches is also given, if we assume  – as is conventionally done – 
that the number of separations from jobs equals a fixed quit rate times employment.. It follows that at a given 
aggregate employment level, the probability for a job seeker to find a job is independent of matching efficiency.   15 
the wage-setting schedule reduces the real wage and increases employment. It can, 
however, be shown that employment increases by less that the work force (Calmfors, 
1994). This means that regular employment falls as a fraction of the work force at the 
same time as it increases as a fraction of the population. It thus matters how employ-
ment is measured when ALMPs are evaluated. As will be discussed in Section 4, these 
measurement issues may be important for judging the effects of labour market policy 
on employment. 
The above discussion is, of course, a gross oversimplification, as the relevant is-
sue often is how effectively a non-employed person searches for a job rather than one 
of whether or not the person is in the labour force and searches at all. If employed 
insiders dominate wage setting, it is the job finding probability of an unemployed in-
sider rather than the average job finding probability of the unemployed that matters. If 
ALMPs raise the relative search efficiency of outsiders, the probability of finding a 
job for an insider falls, as competition for the available jobs is strengthened. This will 
also help shift the wage-setting schedule downwards and raise employment (Layard et 
al., 1991; Calmfors and Lang, 1995). 
So, ALMPs may exert a positive employment effect by increasing the competition 
for the available jobs. But just as with matching efficiency, this requires that the ear-
lier discussed treatment effects are stronger than the locking-in effects.  
 
2.3  Effects on the productivity of job seekers 
Another desired effect of ALMPs is to increase the productivity of job seekers (Calm-
fors, 1994). This is the aim of labour market training as well as of various work expe-
rience programmes, but such an effect may also arise because of on-the-job training in 
a pure job creation scheme. 
An increase in the productivity of job seekers shifts the segment of the marginal 
product curve that applies to job seekers (non-employed workers), i.e. the segment to 
the right of the intersection with the wage-setting schedule, in Figure 4 upwards. Eve-
rything else equal, this results in an increase in regular employment. But an increase 
in the productivity of job seekers may also cause their reservation wages to increase. 
If this occurs, the wage-setting schedule is also shifted upwards in this segment, 
which tends to offset the positive effect on regular employment. If the wage-setting 
schedule is shifted upwards by as much as the employment schedule, the net effect on   16 
regular employment is zero. Whether or not such effects are important is an empirical 
issue. 
 
2.4  Effects on the allocation of the work force 
A fourth intended effect of ALMPs can be to change the allocation of the work force 
between different sectors. According to the Rehn-Meidner model (see Section 1.1), 
the original goal of active labour market policy in Sweden was to transfer labour from 
stagnating low-productivity sectors to expanding high-productivity sectors through 
training programmes and other mobility-enhancing measures. This effect is illustrated 
in Figure 5 (see also Calmfors, 1995; and Fukushima, 1998) with real wages and 
employment relative to the sectoral labour force on the axes. 
 
Figure 5: Reallocation of unemployed between a high-productivity sector and a low-
productivity sector 
 
Assume that there are two sectors in the economy: a high-productivity sector and 
a low-productivity sector. They have the same wage-setting schedule. The wage-
setting schedule is steeper, the higher the employment rate in the sector (the share of 
the work force in the sector that is employed). Assume also that labour demand is 
higher in the high-productivity sector (curve I) than in the low-productivity sector 
(curve II), so that a larger share of the sectoral work force is employed in the high-
productivity than in the low-productivity sector. A transfer of labour from the low-
productivity to the high-productivity sector can be illustrated by a shift of the labour 
demand schedule to the left in the high-productivity sector and a shift to the right in 
the low productivity sector: labour demand as a share of the sectoral work force at a 
given real wage falls in the high-productivity sector where labour supply increases, 
Real   wage 
Sectoral employment 
as a   share   of the sectoral 
labour force 
I 
II   17 
and rises in the low-productivity sector where labour supply decreases. Because of the 
convexity of the wage-setting schedule, the real wage increases only marginally in the 
low-productivity sector, but falls substantially in the high-productivity sector. As a 
consequence, the number of employed persons falls only a little in the low-
productivity sector, whereas it increases by much in the high-productivity sector. The 
net result is that aggregate employment in the economy increases. 
 
2.5  Direct crowding-out (displacement) effects 
An unintended side effect of ALMPs is that they may crowd out regular labour de-
mand (see e.g. Dahlberg and Forslund, 1999). This is likely to apply mainly to sche-
mes of subsidised employment. It could be the case that the same persons would have 
been hired also in the absence of such subsidies or that the subsidies lead employers 
to substitute one category of workers for another. In the former case one speaks of a 
deadweight effect, in the latter case of a substitution effect. Such crowding-out (disp-
lacement) effects presuppose that the unemployed who are hired are substitutes – and 
not complements – to other employees in production, so that the hiring of unemployed 
workers lowers the marginal product of regular employees. 
In terms of Figure 4, direct crowding-out means that the employment schedule 
(the regular labour demand schedule) is shifted to the left. This tends to reduce both 
the real wage and regular employment. 
The direct crowding-out effects need to be seen in association with the competi-
tion effects in Section 2.2. Even if there is complete crowding-out, there may be a 
positive employment effect to the extent that employment of long-term unemployed 
(outsiders) crowds out employment of insiders, so that the latter group meets more 
competition. The crowding-out effects may thus be necessary to reach the desired 
competition effects. 
 
2.6  Accommodation effects on wage setting 
Participation in ALMPs may also give rise to unintended side effects on wage setting 
because the welfare of the unemployed is affected. To improve the welfare of the 
unemployed is often seen as an important objective of active labour market policy in 
itself. There are several possible effects: 
•  Participation in ALMPs may imply higher incomes for job seekers than would 
otherwise be the case, if compensation there is higher than the unemployment 
benefit (Calmfors and Nymoen, 1990; Calmfors and Forslund, 1991).   18 
•  Participants in ALMPs may experience a higher degree of psychological well-
being than the openly unemployed, because programme participation is con-
sidered more meaningful (Korpi, 1994a). 
•  If programme participation is expected to improve future labour market pros-
pects, it will increase the expected future welfare of participants (Calmfors and 
Lang, 1995).  
•  If programme participation means that the participants renew their eligibility 
for unemployment compensation (the earlier Swedish system) or is used as a 
supplement to extend the period of income support beyond the maximum un-
employment benefit period, this will also raise the future expected incomes of 
the unemployed. 
 
All the above effects reduce the welfare difference between having and not having 
a job. Hence, they increase wage pressure both under collective and individual wage 
bargaining. Trade unions have an incentive to negotiate higher wages, if those who 
risk losing their jobs as a consequence of wage rises face better alternative opportuni-
ties. Individuals acquire a better bargaining position vis-à-vis their employers, the 
higher their expected welfare if they quit. In terms of Figure 4, the wage-setting 
schedule is shifted upwards. This means higher real wages and lower regular em-
ployment. This can be seen as an accommodation effect, which leads to indirect 
crowding-out of regular jobs.  
However, there may also be a ”control effect” working in the opposite direction 
(Jackman, 1994). Participation in ALMPs and active job search on part of the unem-
ployed are requirements to receive unemployment compensation. So for some unem-
ployed individuals, programme participation means a welfare loss because they can 
no longer allocate their time freely. Judging from the reactions of some of the unem-
ployed, the so-called activity guarantee in Sweden, which was initiated in 2000, may 
to some degree work in this way (see Section 1.2). To the extent that this is the case, 
the above effects are reversed, and the wage-setting schedule tends to be shifted 
downwards. 
 
2.7  The effects of ALMPs 
Our analysis is summarised in Table 4, which shows the expected direction of the 
various effects. We have put question marks where the expected effects may theoreti-  19 
cally be counteracted by other effects. This applies to matching efficiency and the 
competition for jobs, where treatment and locking-in effects work in opposite direc-
tions. It applies also to the accommodation effects on wage setting, where the wage-
rising effects may be counteracted by control effects. We have indicated with pa-
rentheses that the positive productivity effects may be offset by increased reservation 
wages. 
 
Table 4 The expected effects of ALMPs – a summary of the theoretical discussion 
  The wage given em-
ployment (wage pres-
sure) 
Regular employment given 
the wage 
Net effect on regular 
employment 
Matching  - (?)  + (?)  + (?) 
Competition  - (?)  0  + (?) 
Direct displacement  0  -  - 
Accommodation  + (?)  0  - (?) 
Productivity of job  






+ / (0) 
Allocation of labour  








The net employment effect of ALMPs is obviously an empirical issue. The rest of 
the paper is devoted to a survey of the empirical research on the employment effects 
of ALMPs in Sweden. These studies are in principle of two types: microeconomic and 
macroeconomic. The microeconomic studies evaluate the effects of participation in 
ALMPs for the participating individuals, whereas the macroeconomic ones examine 
the aggregate general-equilibrium effects. 
The microeconomic studies can benefit from data sets with a large number of ob-
servations. By examining whether participation in ALMPs implies larger employment 
chances as compared to non-participation, these studies can give indications of the 
effects on matching efficiency, the competition for jobs, the productivity of the par-
ticipants and the re-allocation of labour. Knowledge on these effects can also be ob-
tained by examining how programme participation affects the mobility of job seekers, 
their search behaviour and the attitudes of employers. 
The microeconomic studies of the effects on individuals do not by definition cap-
ture the effects of ALMPs on non-participants. These general equilibrium effects can 
only by examined in macroeconomic studies. This applies, for example, to the direct 
crowding-out effects and the accommodation effects on wage setting. Only the mac-
roeconomic studies can give the full picture of the effects of ALMPs on employment   20 
and wages. But a problem with these studies is that the number of observations is of-
ten small. 
The two types of studies complement each other. The two subsequent sections 
summarise the studies of these types that have been made in Sweden. 
 
 
3 Microeconomic  studies 
This section surveys the evidence from microeconometric studies of the effects of 
ALMPs on the participants. We focus on the effects on regular employment, but look 
also at the effects on income (since income depends positively on employment). 
The issue is how the labour market outcome of participants compares to the out-
come that would have prevailed had they not participated in an ALMP. The crucial 
element in such an evaluation is to find a comparison group whose outcome equals 
the counterfactual needed to establish the treatment effects. Evaluations are plagued 
by potential problems of sample selection bias. There is a large literature on this 
evaluation problem, which was initiated by Heckman (1979) (see e.g. Heckman et al., 
1999). However, the set-up of the Swedish labour market policy differs from the one 
usually considered in the evaluation literature. As discussed in Section 2.2, there is a 
wide array of continuously ongoing programmes for the unemployed. All unemployed 
may, theoretically, participate and most long-term unemployed do so repeatedly dur-
ing their unemployment spell(s). Therefore, it is difficult to find a proper comparison 
group who neither has participated nor will participate in the future in an ALMP. The 
choice for an unemployed is to participate in a programme now or later, rather than 
now or never (see Carling and Larsson, 2000a; and Sianesi, 2001, for a further discus-
sion). As a consequence, the mere existence of programmes may influence the behav-
iour of non-participants also.  
Also, the fact that most long-term unemployed will ultimately participate in (sev-
eral) ALMPs makes it difficult to evaluate the long-term effects. First, it is difficult to 
relate estimated effects to specific ALMPs. Second, the number of openly unem-
ployed who have never participated, and can therefore be used as a comparison group, 
will be very small. This problem is genuine if treatment effects are not immediate and 
rapidly transient (Carling and Larsson, 2000b). Third, as every long-term unemployed 
is likely sooner or later to participate in an ALMP, the problem of sample selection   21 
bias is exacerbated: job seekers with large difficulties of finding a job tend to be over-
represented among ALMP participants (Sianesi, 2002). 
The evaluation literature on Swedish ALMPs since the mid-1980s must therefore 
be interpreted with caution. It is possible that these evaluations analyse the effect of 
participating at a specific point in time rather than later or in a certain programme 
rather than in another instead of the effect of participation compared to non-
participation as such. 
The early Swedish evaluation literature proceeds from small and “special” data 
sets based on survey data and/or information from personal files kept at the employ-
ment offices. The research of the 1990s leans heavily on the event data base Händel 
(which comprises information on all registered job-seekers since 1991) and some-
times combines this with register or survey data on employment and income. Statis-
tics on search behaviour and employer attitudes are based on survey data. 
This part is organised as follows. Section 3.1 looks at treatment effects of labour 
market training (LMT), whereas Section 3.2 focuses on the effects of job-creation 
programmes. Section 3.3 summarises what is known about the treatment effects on 
youth. Section 3.4 summarises the evidence on the effects of ALMPs on the search 
behaviour of participants, and Section 3.5 reviews the effects on employer attitudes. 
 
3.1  Labour market training 
The research on the effects of labour market training is summarised in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 Treatment effects of labour market training (LMT) 
Study Programme  and 
timing 
Sample   Dependent variable  Results 
Edin & Holmlund  
(1991) 
LMT, 1981–84  Register and survey 
data on 800 16–24 
years old unemploy-








       




Register and survey 




(i) Yearly income 
1982 and 1983; and 










Register and survey 
data on 800 16–24 
years old unemploy-




Insignificant effect  
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Harkman, Jansson  
& Tamás (1996) 
LMT, 1993 
 
Register and survey 






ment 6 months and 
2.5 years after pro-
gramme  
Positive effect only 
if potential selection 
is not considered  
     
Harkman (1997)  LMT, 1994  Register and survey 






ment 2 years after 
programme  
Significant, negative 
effect of training ≤ 
100 days; no signifi-
cant effect of trai-
ning ≥ 100 days; the 
difference of 4 % 
between short and 
long programmes is 
significant  
      











effect 1 year and 
insignificant effect 3 
years after pro-
gramme 
     
Harkman, Johansson 
& Okeke (1999) 
LMT & computer 
activity centres, 
1996 
Register and survey 






ment 1 year after 
programme  
Positive effect of 
LMT only if poten-
tial selection is not 
considered; no sig-
nificant effect of 
computer activity 
centres  
     
Larsson (2000)  LMT, 1992–93  Register data on 600 
20–24 years old 
participants. Non-
participating compa-
rison group through 
propensity score 
matching 
(i) Yearly income; 
and probability to 
(ii) obtain a job; or 
(iii) proceed to regu-





     




Register and survey 
data on 4000 Swit 
participants. Com-
parison group = 
7000 participants in 
similar traditional IT 
training 
Regular employ-




      
Okeke (2001)  LMT, 1998–99  Register and survey 












      
Richardson  &  van  LMT, 1993–2000  Register data on a 1  Unemployment  Significant, negative   23 
den Berg (2002) 
 
% random subsamp-
le of all who became 
openly unemployed 
930101–000622 
(5000 individuals of 
whom 665 participa-
ted in LMT). Biva-
riate duration model 
with individual 
heterogeneity 
duration  effect that vanished 
within two months 
after the training 
ended if unemploy-
ment duration is 
measured from the 
end of LMT; insig-
nificant effect if 
unemployment 
duration is measured 
from the start of 
programme partici-
pation.  
     
Sianesi (2002) 
 
LMT, 1994–99  Register data on 
30,800 adult indivi-




offices for the first 
time in 1994 (1,387 
in LMT) 
(i) Employment 
rate;   
(ii) Job attachment 
on the first job 




tive effects on emp-
loyment rates up to 
30 months, then 
insignificant effect; 
(ii) significant, 
negative effect on 
employment dura-
tion; and (iii) signi-
ficant, positive ef-
fect on benefit col-
lection. The compa-
rison is between 
participation now 
and “waiting in open 
unemployment” 
 
Although results vary a lot between studies, some conclusions can be drawn. The 
estimated effects of labour market training differ between the 1980s and 1990s. 
Evaluations of training acquired during the first half of the 1980s suggest positive 
effects on participants’ employment and/or income. Evaluations of training that took 
place in the 1990s usually find instead insignificant or significantly negative effects. 
Okeke (2001) and to some extent Richardson and van den Berg (2002) are, however, 
exceptions to this pattern.  
Okeke found large positive effects of labour market training undertaken in 1998–
99. It is, however, difficult to interpret the study, as it is not clear from the presenta-
tion how the control group has been selected, but the procedure used might imply a 
positive bias.
6 Richardson and van den Berg find that training (in the 1993-2000 pe-
                                                 
6 This is discussed in Larsson (2001). She points to the problem that arises because the study follows pro-
gramme participants who have completed training (and not participants who have started training). The control 
group can then be chosen in two ways.  Programme participants can be compared either with non-participants who 
have been unemployed for as long a time as the programme participants before they started the programme or with 
non-participants whose unemployment spell equals the sum of the unemployment spell and the time in training of 
participants. Both procedures are likely to give a positive bias in the estimation of the treatment effect. In the first 
case the reason is that non-participants get a longer period of effective job search than participants, as the former   24 
riod) reduces unemployment duration when this is measured from the end of the pro-
gramme. But the effect becomes insignificant when unemployment duration is meas-
ured from the start of the programme. This suggests that a negative locking-in effect 
of labour market training more or less offsets a positive treatment effect once the pro-
gramme has been completed.  
Several – but not all – of the studies finding unfavourable results of training refer 
to the first half of the 1990s when programme volumes were very large. This is dis-
cussed in more detail in Section 6.3. 
The study by Sianesi (2002) deserves a special comment, as she has explicitly 
taken the problem that all long-term unemployed are likely sooner or later to end up 
in labour market programmes into account. She therefore tries only to estimate the 
effect of joining a training programme at a certain point of time rather than later. The 
control group is chosen to be all those who are not participating in a programme at 
that point of time. 
Another observation refers to the differences between short-run and effects of la-
bour market training. The short-run effects are often insignificant or even negative. 
However, with a time horizon of a few years the estimated effects are more positive 
(1980s) or are, at least, no longer negative (1990s). A conceivable explanation is that 
training increases the reservation wages of participants (see Section 3.3). However, 
Richardson and van den Berg (2002) find a different pattern. According to their study, 
the treatment effect of training vanishes after two months. The authors suggest that 
the short-run treatment effect could be due mainly to extra placement efforts on the 
part of employment officers.  
There is some evidence to suggest that income and employment effects increase 
with the length of training. But here the amount of research is very small.  
 
3.2  Job creation  
There are a number of studies on the effect of job creation, of which a few looks also 
at the effect of labour market training. However, given the amount of different job 
creation programmes, less is known about the specific effect of single programmes 
                                                                                                                                            
are likely to search more effectively for a job than participants during the period the latter spend in the programme. 
In the second case non-participants with a low job-finding probability (who are thus not likely to have found a job 
during the programme period of the participants) will be over-represented in the control group.   25 
than about labour market training. The studies of job creation measures are surveyed 
in Table 6.  
 
Table 6 Treatment effects of job creation 
Study Programme  and 
timing 
Sample Dependent  vari-
able 
Results 
      
Sehlstedt & Schrö-
der   
(1989) 
Recruitment subsi-
dies & relief work, 
1984 
Register and survey 




ation, 1987  
Significant, positive 
effect of recruitment 
subsidies if part of 
an “action plan”. No 
significant effect of 
relief work 
     




Register and survey 
data on 800 16–24 
years old unemplo-
yed in the Stock-
holm area, 1981; 
and register data on 
300 displaced wor-
kers in northern 
Sweden, 1977 
Job finding probabi-
lity in (i) the con-




effect in the con-
temporary unemp-
loyment spell, but 
significant, negative 
effect on subsequent 
unemployment 
spells 






Register and survey 
data on 800 16–24 
years old unemplo-
yed in the Stock-





      
Axelsson, Brännäs  
& Löfgren (1996) 
LMT, work experi-
ence schemes, relief 
work & youth prac-
tice, 1993 
Register data on 10 
000 20–54 years old 
unemployed, 1993 
Employment within 
30 days after pro-
gramme  
LMT, work experi-
ence schemes and 
relief work are 
equivalent alternati-
ves, but youth prac-
tice is better 
     
Harkman, Johans-






work & work expe-
rience schemes, 
1996 
Register and survey 





Employment 1 year 
after programme  
Large significant, 
positive effects of 
recruitment subsidi-
es, and significant, 
positive effects of 
trainee replacement 
and work placement 
schemes as well. No 
significant effects of 
relief work and 
work experience 
schemes  








Register data on 
individuals with 
self-employment 
grants (9000) or 
recruitment subsidi-
es (14 000) in 1995 
or 1996 





grants than for rec-
ruitment subsidies 
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Okeke (1999)  Self-employment 
grants, 1994 
Register and survey 







terprises with and 
without self-
employment grants 
      
Larsson (2000)  Youth practice, 
1992–93 
Register data on 600 






(i) Yearly income  
(ii) Employment  
(iii) Regular educa-
tion 1–2 years after 
programme 
Significant, negative 
effect on yearly 
income and emplo-
yment; no signifi-
cant effect on edu-
cation 
     




Register and survey 
data on 8000 entre-
preneurs 
(i) Enterprise survi-
val rate; and 
(ii) probability to 
earn a living thro-









ding to self-reported 
averages a positive 
effect on the proba-
bility to earn a li-
ving through the 
enterprise 














Register data on 
25 000 individuals 
who became unem-
ployed and began 
their first pro-








schemes and work 
placement schemes 
than for LMT, com-
puter activity cen-
tres, work experien-
ce schemes and 
relief work 
     




LMT, relief work, 
recruitment subsidi-
es and trainee repla-
cement schemes, 
1994–1999 
Register data on 
30800 25–54 years 
old who became 
unemployed for the 
first time in 1994 
and were entitled to 
unemployment 
benefits. Compari-
son group through 
propensity score 
matching 
(i) Employment rate 
over time 
 (ii) Job attachment 
on the first job 
found  




ment subsidies and 
trainee replacement 
schemes than for 
LMT, “work practi-
ce” and relief work. 
Subsidies also better 
than “waiting in 
open unemploy-
ment” both in terms 
of employment rates 
and job attachment 
 
Some of the studies in Table 6 have tried to evaluate the effects on subsequent 
employment of participation in various job creation programmes as compared to open   27 
unemployment, whereas other studies have tried only to compare various programmes 
with each other (but not with open unemployment) or to study the effect of participat-
ing in a programme at a given point of time rather than later. The latter studies avoid 
the problem that most long-term unemployed will sooner or later end up in a pro-
gramme, which makes it hard to find a comparison group of non-participants (see the 
discussion in the introduction to Section 3).  
The evidence suggests that the job creation programmes work better the closer 
they are to a regular employment relation.  Self-employment grants and recruitment 
subsidies (and possibly also work placement schemes) appear to have positive effects 
on subsequent regular employment, while work experience schemes and relief work 
do not. This ranking of programmes is also supported by the studies that only com-
pare different programmes with each other. It is also interesting to note that the “best” 
job-creation programmes seem to work better than labour market training.  
A last point of interest refers to Sianesi (2002), who analysed also the effect of 
ALMPs on the probability to obtain unemployment benefits over time. She found that 
participants in the three programmes (“work practice”, labour market training and 
relief work) that did less well in terms of employment increased the likelihood (of 
participants) to obtain benefits significantly. This indicates that the possibility to re-
new eligibility for unemployment insurance could have been an incentive to join a 
programme. Another aspect of this problem is illuminated by Sianesi (2001), who 
studied the impact of ALMPs as a whole in 1994-99 (aggregating all programmes into 
a composite variable) for all (116 000 individuals) who registered as unemployed in 
1994. According to this study, those who entered a programme at a given date re-
mained unemployed for about two months longer than those who joined at a later 
date.
7 The worst results were obtained for participants who joined a programme close 
to the time of benefit exhaustion (after 14 months of unemployment), possibly mainly 
in order to renew benefit eligibility.  
 
                                                 
7 The results in Sianesi (2001) are somewhat contradictory, as she also found that those who joined a pro-
gramme (as opposed to waiting) had significantly higher employment probabilities (of the order of magnitude of 
five percentage points) over the first five years after the start of the programme. This holds for the whole period 
except for the first six months, which corresponds to the actual length of most programmes. The study also exam-
ined the effect of programmes on the probability of retaining a job when once found and on the probability of 
escaping unemployment if falling back into it, but could not find any significant effects.   28 
3.3  Effects for youth 
The estimated effects of programmes for young people vary. Several earlier studies of 
the 1980s found positive effects, at least for some programmes in some circumstances 
and in the long run. But these results were based on small samples and cannot be gen-
eralised to the population at large. The one study of the 1990s (Larsson, 2000) found 
negative employment and income effects of both labour market training and youth 
practice. In addition, she found that labour market training (but not youth practice) 
had a decreasing effect on the transition rates to regular education. The reasons behind 
these results are not clear. But the fact that Harkman, Jansson and Tamás (1996) – 
who analysed the effect of training for an, on average, older population – did not find 
a similar effect indicate that the results obtained by Larsson may relate to the age 
group as such. 
 
3.4  Search activity  
The probability to obtain a job is influenced by the job applicants’ search activity. It is 
therefore of interest to study whether or not ALMPs influence search activity. This is 
the topic of a number of survey studies, which have examined the difference in search 
behaviour between programme participants and openly unemployed. The studies are 
summarised in Table 7. 
 
Table 7 Search activity  
Study Programme  and 
timing 
Sample Dependent  variable  Results 






Register and survey 
data on 500 20–24 
years old unemploy-
ed, 1984  
Search activity and 




      





Register and survey 
data on 800 16–24 
years old unemploy-
ed in the Stockholm-
area, 1981 
Search activity and 




        
Ackum Agell (1996)  LMT & job creation 
programmes (work 
experience schemes, 
relief work & 
trainee replacement 
schemes), 1993–94  
Survey data on 4000 
20–54 years old 
unemployed, 1991 
Search activity and 
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The studies of search activity point to important locking-in effects of ALMPs. Irres-
pective of timing, programme and age group, all surveys find that openly unemployed 
search more frequently and in more ways than programme participants. Ackum Agell 
(1996) emphasised that participants have less time to search for work than do non-
participants. Also, it can be beneficial to society at large that participants do not look 
for work if the programme forms part of a comprehensive plan to improve their labour 
market prospects. But this conclusion no longer holds if placement in ALMPs is used 
to renew eligibility for unemployment insurance. Either way, the studies of search 
activity do suggest that ALMPs cause locking-in effects. 
 
3.5  Employer attitudes  
Employer attitudes towards different categories of job applicants is another factor 
that influences the possibility of finding a job. Several survey studies have examined 
the effect of ALMPs in this respect. The studies are summarised in Table 8 and the 
conclusions are given below.  
The most favourable results for the effects of ALMPs on individuals are obtained 
in survey studies of employer attitudes. Although questions and estimated effects dif-
fer, the studies of attitudes suggest that employers judge former ALMP participants 
more favourably than unemployed who have not participated in programmes. This 
evidence also suggests that labour market training is preferred to the other pro-
grammes. 
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Table 8 Employer attitudes 
Study  Source of  
information 
Sample Dependent   
Variable 
Results 





at ~ 150 companies 
Share who believes 
that (i) unemployed 
non-participants; 
and (ii) participants 
are potentially less 
productive than 




participants 18 % 
     
Behrenz (1998b)  Survey, 1995 
 
Company represen-
tatives at ~ 800 
companies 
Share who automa-
tically sorts out (i) 
unemployed non-
participants; and (ii) 
participants  
(i) Openly unem-
ployed 4.2 % 
(iia) LMT partici-
pants 1.2 % 
(iib) Participants in 
other programmes 
1.6 % 
     






at ~ 150 companies 
Share who believes 
that (i) unemployed 
non-participants and 
(ii) participants are 
potentially less 
productive than 
other job seekers 
(i) Openly unem-
ployed 27 % 
(iia) LMT partici-
pants 15 % 
(iib) Participants in 
work experience 
schemes/ relief work 
20% 
     
Klingvall (1998) Survey,  1998 
 
Employers at ~ 280 
workplaces 
 
Share who prefers to 
hire one category 
rather than another  
(i) Openly unem-
ployed 2 % 
(iia) LMT partici-
pants 30 % 




4  Macroeconomic studies  
This section surveys the macroeconomic studies of the total (general equilibrium) 
effects, of ALMPs in Sweden. Doing this we follow our earlier classification in Table 
4. 
There are some general methodological problems in the macroeconomic studies. It 
may be difficult to obtain precise estimates of effects because the number of observa-
tions that can be used in the econometric analyses is often small. Another problem is 
two-way causality. It is not only the case that ALMPs may affect (un)employment, 
but changes in the labour market situation may also trigger political decisions to ad-
just the volume of ALMPs. This may give rise to simultaneity bias and identification 
problems. We repeatedly return to how this issue has been handled in various studies 
below.   31 
Section 4.1 reviews the macroeconomic evidence on the effects on the matching 
process. Section 4.2 discusses direct crowding-out (displacement) effects and Section 
4.3 the effects on labour force participation. Section 4.4 surveys the studies of aggre-
gate wage-setting effects, which are the net of several of the effects discussed in Sec-
tion 2. Section 4.5, finally, reviews reduced-form estimations of the total effects on 
(un)employment. 
 
4.1  Beveridge curves, matching functions and migration relationships 
A first type of macroeconomic studies directly shed light on the efficiency of the mat-
ching process. These studies concern Beveridge curves, matching functions and geo-
graphical mobility. 
Somewhat surprisingly, only two studies of Sweden have looked at the effects of 
ALMPs on matching in a Beveridge curve context (Jackman et al., 1990; Calmfors, 
1993) Neither of the two available Beveridge curve studies show any effects of 
ALMPs on matching efficiency.
8 But the main conclusion is that we largely lack 
knowledge of the Beveridge curve effects as none of the studies covers the 1990s. 
There are two studies of matching functions, which relate the number of hirings to 
the numbers of vacancies and unemployed, on Swedish data. Edin and Holmlund 
(1991) found that programme participation contributes to matching, but that the effect 
is only half that of open unemployment.
9 This suggests that locking-in effects domi-
nate treatment effects of these programmes in the short run. Hallgren (1996) found 
that subsidised employment had a significant negative impact on matching, whereas 
the opposite was true for labour market training. But again the main conclusion is the 
lack of empirical knowledge. 
Geographical mobility is one important dimension of the matching process. 
Hence, the effects of ALMPs on this variable may serve as a proxy for the effects on 
matching. Here, several studies have been made. They are summarised in Table 9. 
 
                                                 
8 The relevant relationship to look at is the one between vacancies and total unemployment (the sum of open 
unemployment and programme participation). Calmfors (1993) estimates how this relationship is affected by a 
change in the accommodation ratio (the ratio between programme participation and total unemployment). Jackman 
et al. (1990) study instead the relationship between vacancies and open unemployment, but their results are recal-
culated in Calmfors (1993). 
9 The authors could not reject the hypothesis that relief work and labour market training have the same effect 
(and that this effect is half that of open unemployment). However, when the effects of training and relief work 
were estimated separately, it could not be rejected that training and unemployment have the same effect.   32 
Table 9 The effects of ALMPs on geographical mobility 
Study Data  Results 
McCormick & Skedinger 
(1991) 
24 counties,  
1968–85 
Locking-in effects 
Nilsson (1995)  24 counties,  
1966–93 
Locking-in effects 
Westerlund (1997)  24 counties,  
1970–89  
Locking-in effects or insignificant  
results 
Heiborn (1998)  24 counties,  
1964–93  
Mixed results 
Westerlund (1998)  24 counties,  
1970–89  
Mixed results 
Widerstedt (1998)  541 males,  
1981–91  
No effects 
Fredriksson (1999)  24 counties,  
1968–93 
Small locking-in effects 
 
As is clear from the table, the results concerning geographical mobility are mixed. 
But most of the evidence suggests that ALMPs have reduced mobility. 
 
4.2  Direct crowding-out (displacement) 
As discussed in Section 2.5, job creation programmes are likely to cause direct displa-
cement. The studies of this fall into two categories: (i) survey studies; and (ii) econo-
metric studies of labour demand. 
 
Survey studies 
In a number of surveys, employers, programme participants and employment officers 
have been asked whether they (i) believe that the work performed by programme par-
ticipant(s) would have been performed by anyone in the absence of the programme 
(substitution effects); and (ii) in some cases, if this question was answered in the af-
firmative, whether the same person(s) would have been employed (deadweight ef-
fects). 
Such surveys suffer from a number of problems. First, participants may have an 
exaggerated view of their importance for the activity concerned. This could lead to an 
upward bias in the estimated displacement. Second, both employers and employment 
officers have incentives to avoid the impression that programmes are abused, which 
could give a bias in the opposite direction. Third, respondents are not likely to be able 
to evaluate the extent to which programmes crowd out employment in other work-
places than that associated with the programme.   33 
A number of survey studies are summarised in Table 10. Although the results vary 
considerably, all studies but one indicate that direct displacement occurs.
  In most 
cases the estimated displacement is substantial. 
 
Table 10 Survey studies of direct displacement
a 
Study Method  Programme  Results 
Sehlstedt &  
Schröder  
(1989) 
Interviews with participants  
and supervisors 
RS for youth  Participants: 49 % 
Supervisors: 23 % 
      
LO (1993a,  
1993b, 1994a,  
1994b) 
Questionnaires to participants  WES  20–39 % 
      
Temo (1993,  
1994, 1995)
b 
Telephone interviews with  
participants, employers and  
employment officers  
WES  Participants: 17 % 1993, 12 %  
1994; Organisers: 3–7 % 
      
NUTEK  
(1994) 
Questionnaires to participants  
and employers 
WES  About 30 % according to both  
participants and employers 
      
AMS (1995)  Questionnaires to organisers   RS  36 % (of which slightly more  
than half would have recruited  
the same person). 
      
Hallström  
(1995) 
Interviews with participants  WES  20–25 % 
      
Anxo &  
Dahlin (1996) 
Questionnaires to employers  TES, GES  84 % (GES); 69 % (TES) 
      
AMS (1997)
  Questionnaires to participants  RW, WPS, MYP, 
WES, TRS, RS 
RW: 24 %; WPS: 16 %; MYP:  
10 %; WES: 8 %; RS: 48 %;  
TRS: 42 % 
      
AMS (1998a)   Questionnaires to participants  WES, TRS, RS, 
MYP, RW, WPS 
WES: 13 %; TRS: 51 %; RS:  
40 %; MYP: 14 %; RW: 27 %;  
WPS: 21 % 
      
AMS (1998b)  Questionnaires to participants  
and employers 
RS, RW, WES, TRS, 
WPS, TPJ, RJ, MYP 
RS: 35 %; RW: 14 %; WES:  
0 %; TRS: 32 %; WPS: 8 %;  
TPJ: 1 %; RJ: 1 %; MYP: 3 % 
      
Johansson  
(1999) 
Questionnaires to participants  
and employment officers 
RJ  Participants: 16 %, 26 %
c; 
Employment officers: 11 %
d. 
Notes: 
a. The following abbreviations are used in the table: WES – work experience schemes, WPS – 
work placement schemes, RW – relief work, GES – general employment subsidy, MYP – mu-
nicipal youth programmes, TPJ – temporary public jobs, RJ – resource jobs, TES – targeted em-
ployment subsidy, RS – recruitment subsidy, TRS – trainee replacement schemes. 
b.  The Ministry of Labour commissioned the study and the results were reported in AMS (1997). 
c.  This refers to answers to the question whether the participant believes that the employer actually 
could have afforded to hire someone in the absence of the programme. 
d.  The fraction that answered ”Yes, in most cases”. 
   34 
A way to summarise the information in Table 10 is to compute the average dis-
placement for each programme according to the studies shown. The results are re-
ported in Table 11, where the programmes have been ranked according to the size of 
the average displacement effect.
10 There is a clear tendency that the closer to the regu-
lar labour market a programme is, the larger is the estimated displacement. For re-
cruitment subsidies, trainee replacement schemes, general employment subsidies, and 
targeted employment subsidies, the estimated displacement effects are between 39 
and 84 percent. 
 
Table 11 Average direct displacement effects according to the studies in Table 10. 
Programme Average  displacement 
effect (%) 
Number of studies 
Temporary public jobs (TPJ)  1.0  1 
Municipal youth programmes  
(MYP)  9.0 3 
Resource jobs (RJ)  14.3  3 
Work placement schemes (WPS)  15.0  3 
Work experience schemes (WES)  15.6  11 
Relief work (RW)  21.7  3 
Recruitment subsidies (RS)  38.5  6 
Trainee replacement schemes (TRS)  41.7  3 
General employment subsidy (GES)  69.0  1 
Targeted employment subsidy (TES)  84.0  1 
 
In addition to the studies in Table 10, a number of earlier studies (Peterson and 
Vlachos, 1978; AMS, 1981; AMS, 1983; AMS, 1985; RRV, 1989) used survey meth-
ods to estimate the total employment effects of temporary or permanent wage subsi-
dies. The identified employment effects were generally small. So, these studies, too, 
suggest substantial displacement. 
 
Econometric studies of direct displacement 
The econometric studies identify the relationship between programmes and regular 
employment by comparing actual employment with the employment that would have 
been realised in the absence of programmes. Most of the studies have estimated tradi-
tional labour demand schedules augmented with measures of the volume of program-
mes.  
A fundamental problem for econometric studies of direct displacement is that the 
relation between programmes and employment goes both ways: employment may 
                                                 
10 The table should be interpreted with caution, as the averages derive from studies using different methods, and 
some programmes have been subject to a large number of studies and others to only a few ones.   35 
depend on programme participation, but the size of programmes is also likely to de-
pend on (un)employment. This simultaneity problem, discussed in the introduction to 
Section 5, may give rise to biased estimates of the effects of ALMPs. The problem is 
considered in different ways and to a various extent in the studies. 
The econometric studies of displacement are much fewer than the survey studies. 
The results are summarised in Table 12. 
 
Table 12 Econometric studies of direct displacement 
Study Programme,  data  Results 
Gramlich &  
Ysander (1981) 
RW; aggregate time series data 1964 – 77.  Road construction: 100 %; Health  
and welfare: 0 % 
Forslund (1996)  WES, LMT, RW, youth programmes, TRS;  
panel of the Swedish municipalities 1990 – 94.  
WES: 0 %; LMT: 0 %; RW: 84 %;  
youth programmes: 76 % 
Forslund &  
Krueger (1997) 
RW; panel of the Swedish counties 1976 – 91,  
1980 – 91. 
Construction workers: 69 %;  
Health and welfare 0 % 
Löfgren & Wik 
ström (1997) 
WES, LMT, RW, youth programmes, TRS;  
panel of the Swedish municipalities 1990 – 94. 
WES: 0 %; LMT: 0 %; RW: 0 %;  
youth programmes: 94 %; TRS: 0 % 
Dahlberg &  
Forslund (1999) 
RW, LMT, subsidised employment; panel of  
the Swedish municipalities 1987 – 96. 
RW: 66 %; LMT 0 %; subsidised em 
ployment: 65 % 
Edin, Forslund &  
Holmlund (1999) 
Youth programmes; panel of the Swedish  
municipalities 1990 – 94. 
76 % 
Note: Only results that are significantly different from zero are shown. Where the authors have estima-
ted several models, we show the results preferred by the authors. For abbreviations, see Table 10. In 
addition to the notation in that table, LMT denotes labour market training. 
 
Generally, the econometric studies give higher estimates of displacement than the 
survey studies. Typical figures are well above 60 percent. One possible explanation 
for the difference in results is that displacement is partly the result of distorted compe-
tition. Such effects are clearly difficult to assess for the respondents in survey studies. 
Another difference between the two types of studies is that many of the econometric 
investigations do not distinguish between different programmes. Hence, the effects 
are averages over several programmes. As an example, both work experience schemes 
and youth practice were included in “subsidised employment” in Dahlberg and Fors-
lund (1999). The average displacement effect for subsidised employment in this study 
was 65 percent. This figure would, for example, be consistent with youth programmes 
crowding out significantly more than 65 percent and work experience schemes crowd-
ing out significantly less.   36 
Most of the studies of displacement effects have tried to handle the simultaneity 
problem discussed in the introduction to Section 4 through various methods (vector 
autoregressions, instrumental-variable estimations, and comparisons between sectors 
with and without job creation schemes). The fact that the studies have not found dis-
placement effects of labour market training (although the size of training programmes 
can be expected to change in response to the employment situation in a similar way as 
job creation programmes) also suggests that the relationships found reflect the effect 
of programmes on employment rather than the other way around. 
 
4.3  Labour force participation 
The effects of ALMPs on labour force participation is yet another area where research 
efforts have been modest. We are aware of only three studies that deal directly with 
the issue: Wadensjö (1993), Johansson and Markowski (1995), and Johansson (2002). 
All studies indicate strong positive effects of ALMPs on labour force participation.  
In Section 2.2 we discussed how a positive effect of ALMPs on labour force par-
ticipation could lead to a fall in employment as a share of the labour force, at the same 
time as employment increases as a share of the population. For this reason, different 
ways of measuring regular employment (relative to the labour force or to the popula-
tion) in other studies can give indirect evidence on the labour force effects. For exam-
ple, Dahlberg and Forslund (1999) found that direct displacement was larger when 
regular employment was measured as a share of the labour force than when it was 
measured as a share of the population. This result is also consistent with a positive 
effect of ALMPs on labour force participation.
11 
However, the results on labour force participation should be interpreted with cau-
tion. If programme participation has been used as a means to renew eligibility for un-
employment benefits, the increase in labour force participation has not necessarily 
meant an increase in effective labour supply. 
 
4.4 Wage  setting 
For a number of reasons discussed in Section 2, ALMPs may affect wage setting. The 
mechanisms involve effects on matching, the competition in the labour market, the 
welfare and productivity of job seekers, and the allocation of the labour force across 
                                                 
11 Löfgren and Wikström (1997) also found larger displacement effects when employment was measured rela-
tive to the labour force than when it was measured relative to the population.   37 
sectors. The net effect is theoretically unclear. Estimates of wage-setting schedules 
can throw light on this issue. A large number of such studies have been undertaken. In 
all cases, real wage equations including measures of unemployment and the volume 
of labour market programmes as explanatory variables have been estimated. The main 
results are summarised in Table 13. 
 
Table 13 The effects of ALMPs on the real wage
a 
Study  The effect of ALMPs 
  Short run  Long run 
Newell & Symons (1987)  0  0 
Calmfors & Forslund (1990, 1991)  +  + 
Calmfors & Nymoen (1990)  +  + 
Holmlund (1990)  na  + 
Löfgren & Wikström (1991)
b  +/0 0/+ 
Skedinger (1991)
c  + + 
Forslund (1992)
d  +/- +/- 
OECD (1993)
e  - - 
Edin, Holmlund & Östros (1994)
f  0/0/0 0/0/0 
Forslund & Risager (1994)
g  0 0 
Forslund (1995)  0  + 
Blomskog (1997)
h  na +/-/0 
Okeke (1998)
i  na - 




Rødseth & Nymoen (1999)  0  + 
Forslund & Kolm (2000)  0  0 
Thomas (2000)  -  na 
Notes: 
a. A ”+”-sign indicates a significantly positive effect, a ”-”-sign a significantly negative effect and 
”0” no significant effect.  
b. The first effect refers to relief work, the second to labour market training. 
c. Data pertain to different groups of employees in mining and manufacturing 1971–88. The pro-
gramme studied is relief work. 
d. The data refer to twelve unemployment insurance funds. The first effect refers to relief work, the 
second to labour market training. 
e. The regression covers the period 1985–90 for a cross-section of 19 OECD countries. A number 
of effects were assumed to be equal across countries, whereas the effect of ALMPs was esti-
mated separately for each country. 
f. The estimates pertain to individual wages for workers in engineering 1972–87. The effects refer 
to total programmes, labour market training and relief work, respectively. The results in the ta-
ble are IV estimates. OLS estimates gave significant, wage-reducing effects of total programmes 
and labour market training both in the short run and in the long run, and of relief work in the 
long run. 
g. Separate estimates for industry and the rest of the business sector. 
h. Different results in different model specifications. 
i. The estimated models are “wage curves” on micro data. Okeke did not consistently find that 
ALMPs have contributed to less wage pressure. The shown negative effect was, however, found 
in most specifications. 
j. Effects were estimated for the periods 1965–90 and 1965–98, respectively. 
 
Table 13 shows mixed results. Many studies find that larger ALMPs increase 
wage pressure, but many studies do not find any significant effect. Only three studies   38 
(OECD, 1993; Okeke, 1998; Thomas, 2000) suggest that ALMPs may reduce wage 
pressure. Most studies do not distinguish between different programmes. No consis-
tent pattern emerges from the three studies (Löfgren and Wikström, 1991; Forslund, 
1992; Edin, Holmlund and Östros, 1994) that estimate separate effects of labour mar-
ket training and relief work. 
Most of the studies cover periods ending before the deep recession of the 1990s. 
As both unemployment and ALMPs reached peak levels during this recession, it is 
uncertain to what extent the results from earlier studies apply to the 1990s. To the 
extent that compensation levels in programmes were lowered and the expected treat-
ment effects on the probability of finding a job or on future income deteriorated, one 
should expect less unfavourable (or more favourable) wage effects of ALMPs. How-
ever, Johansson et al. (1999), Rødseth and Nymoen (1999), and Forslund and Kolm 
(2000) did not find any significant changes in the wage-setting behaviour between the 
1990s and earlier periods. 
Simultaneity problems of the same kind as for studies of displacement effects may 
be present also in the estimation of wage effects. However, because it probably takes 
time for wage changes to influence employment and for employment changes to trig-
ger changes in programme volumes, the problem is likely to be less severe in this 
case. A more serious problem may be that programme participation covaries with 
long-term unemployment, so that adverse wage-setting effects of ALMPs could re-
flect that higher long-term unemployment reduces the competition for jobs that insid-
ers meet (see Section 3.2). 
 
4.5 Reduced-form  estimates 
A last type of studies is reduced-form estimates of the effects of ALMPs on 
(un)employment, i.e. estimates of the total net effects through all channels discussed 
in Section 2. Put differently, these estimations examine how the intersection between 
the wage-setting and employment schedules in Figure 4 is affected by the size of 
ALMPs. 
The results from four reduced-form studies are summarised in Table 14. 
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Table 14 The effects of ALMPs in reduced-form estimates 
Study Period    Results 




series data 1969–90 
Job creation schemes crowd out regular employment and  
lower open unemployment. No significant effects on 
wages. 




sions, aggregate time 
series data 1979–91 
Youth programmes crowd out regular youth employ-
ment  
(110% in the short run).
12 




gregate time series 
data 1960–93 
No effect on open unemployment of aggregate ALMPs. 
    
Calmfors &  
Skedinger 
(1995) 
Reduced form, panel 
data for counties 
1966–90 
Job creation schemes crowd out regular employment; 
unstable  
results for labour market training.  
 
The results in the table suggest that especially job creation schemes tend to reduce 
regular employment, but also that they probably contribute to lower open unemploy-
ment. As in the studies of direct displacement, the simultaneity problem is potentially 
quite serious. Calmfors and Skedinger (1996) tried to handle it through instrumental 
variables methods (one assumption being that the political majority in a county influ-
ences the volume of ALMPs). 
 
4.6  Conclusions from the macroeconomic studies  
Just as in the case of microeconomic studies, the overall picture from the macroeco-
nomic studies of ALMPs in Sweden is rather disappointing. There is little evidence 
that ALMPs make the matching process more efficient; rather the studies of geo-
graphical mobility suggest the opposite. There is evidence of large direct displace-
ment effects of those job creation schemes that most closely resemble regular em-
ployment, but not of labour market training. Some evidence indicates that pro-
grammes tend to raise wage pressure, whereas other evidence does not point in this 
direction. Reduced-form estimates seem to show that programmes (at least job crea-
tion schemes) tend to reduce regular employment, even though they may help reduce 
open unemployment. The most favourable effects of ALMPs refer to labour force 
participation, which seems to be increased by large programmes. 
 
                                                 
12 Holmlund (1995) criticised Skedinger’s assumption that aggregate unemployment is exogenous, and showed 
that displacement falls to 40 percent if this assumption is dropped. Skedinger’s analysis was also criticised by 
Sjöstrand (1996a). See also Sjöstrand (1996b) and Skedinger (1996a, b).   40 
5  Reduced-form studies on OECD data 
Beginning with the influential study by Layard et al. (1991), a large number of studies 
have tried to explain unemployment differences among OECD countries by differ-
ences in labour market institutions. The earlier studies explained cross-country varia-
tions in unemployment rates with cross-country variation in labour market institu-
tions. Later studies have used panel data to exploit both cross-sectional and time-
series variations. Most of these studies have examined the influence of ALMPs. As 
these studies have usually been interpreted to give very favourable results for ALMPs, 
it may be of some interest to compare them with the studies of Sweden that we have 
surveyed. 
 
5.1 Main  results 
The results in the studies of the OECD countries cannot be directly compared with 
those in the studies of Sweden. The reason is that the former studies use measures of 
expenditures on ALMPs (the only comparable measures available for all OECD coun-
tries), usually spending per unemployed person as a fraction of GDP per capita (which 
was introduced by Layard et al., 1991), as explanatory variables, and open unem-
ployment as the dependent variable. This does not allow direct estimates of how total 
(and open) unemployment is affected by programme participation, i.e., of how much 
displacement occurs. To derive these effects, the results in the studies on OECD data 
have to be recalculated using certain assumptions. The Appendix describes how this 
was done. The results are shown in Table 15.  
 
Table 15 The effects of ALMPs on (un)employment in cross-section and panel data studies of 
the OECD countries  
Study  Countries and period  Effect on:  Results
a 
Layard, Nickell  
& Jackman  
(1991) 
20 OECD countries; 
1983–88; cross-section  
data 
Open unemployment  -   
(-1.53) 
    Total unemployment  0   
(-0.53) 
      
OECD (1993)  19 OECD countries; 
1983–88; cross-section  
data 
Open unemployment (Layard et al. measure of 
ALMPs) 
 
     - 
    Open unemployment (ALMP expenditures as a 
fraction of mean wage multiplied by the labour 
force) 
0   41 
 
      
Heylen (1993)  18 OECD countries;  
second half of the  
1980s; cross-section  
data 
Real-wage sensitivity to unemployment variations
b 
(effect of expenditures on total ALMPs, employ-
ment service and labour market training, respec-
tively) 
- 
    Real-wage sensitivity to unemployment varia- 
tions (effect of job creation measures)  0 
      
Zetterberg  
(1993) 
19 OECD countries; 
1985–91, panel data 
Open unemployment (ALMP expenditures as a  
fraction of total expenditures on labour market  
policies) 
-   
(-1.49) 
   Total unemployment  -   
(-0.49) 
      
Jackman,  
Layard &  
Nickell (1996) 
20 OECD countries  
1983–88 and 1989–94;  
panel data 
Open unemployment  0   
(-0.06) 
    Long-term open unemployment   
- 
    Short-term open unemployment   
0 
    Total unemployment  +  (0.94) 
      
Scarpetta  
(1996) 
17 OECD countries;  
1983–93; panel data  Open unemployment  - 
(-0.51) 
    Total unemployment  +  (0.49) 
    Employment as a fraction of the population   
+ 
      
Forslund &  
Krueger (1997) 
OECD countries;  
1983–88 and 1993;  
cross-section data 





    Total unemployment 1983 – 88; (Zetterberg  
measure of ALMPs) 
 
0  (0.17) 
    Open unemployment 1983 – 88, (ALMP expen- 
diture as a fraction of GDP)  0 
    Open unemployment 1993; Zetterberg measure  
of ALMPs  + 
      
Elmeskov,  
Martin & Scar 
petta (1998) 
OECD countries; 
1983–95; panel data  Open unemployment 
-   
(-1.18) 
   Total unemployment  0   
(-0.18) 
      
Nickell &  
Layard (1999) 
20 OECD countries;  
1983–88 and 1989–94;  
panel data 
Open unemployment 
-   
(-0.18) 
    Long-term open unemployment  - 
    Short-term open unemployment  0 
    Total unemployment  +  (0.82) 
    Employment as a fraction of the population  0   42 
 
      
Blanchard &  
Wolfers 2000 
20 OECD countries;  
1960–95; panel data  
with five-year averages 
Open unemployment 
-   
(-1.43) 
   Total unemployment  -   
(-0.43) 
 Notes: 
a. The minus and plus signs indicate the signs of the effects on the respective variables. A zero in-
dicates a non-significant effect. Numbers in parentheses indicate the calculated effect on the 
variable in question of an increase in the participation in ALMPs by 1 percentage point of the 
labour force. 
b. According to conventional theory, the sensitivity of the real wage to variations in unemploy-
ment is negatively related to equilibrium unemployment (Layard et al., 1991; Nickell and 
Layard, 1999). 
c.  See the entry for Zetterberg (1993) above in the table. 
 
Most of the studies reported in the table support the hypothesis that an expansion 
of ALMPs contributes to lower open unemployment. Two of the studies also show a 
larger effect on long-term than short-term open unemployment (Jackman et al., 1996; 
Nickell and Layard, 1999). This is, of course, to be expected, as programme place-
ment can be used to interrupt long unemployment spells. However, looking at the 
calculated effects on total unemployment (the sum of open unemployment and pro-
gramme participation), the picture is different. Some studies indicate that total unem-
ployment increases when ALMPs expand, others that it decreases. A couple of studies 
seem also to find insignificant effects.  
 
5.2  The interpretation of the results  
There is reason to suspect that the problem of simultaneity bias in the studies reported 
above is quite serious. The reason is that the Layard et al. measure of ALMPs used in 
most of the studies, i.e. spending per unemployed person as a fraction of GDP, is like-
ly to covary negatively with unemployment (OECD, 1993; Forslund and Krueger, 
1997). Some of the studies have just neglected this problem. Others have tried to ad-
dress it in various ways. OECD (1993) substituted ALMP expenditure as a fraction of 
the mean wage multiplied by the labour force, and Forslund and Krueger (1997) 
ALMP expenditure as a fraction of GDP, for the Layard et al. measure. In both studies 
the introduction of the alternative measure resulted in insignificant estimates of the 
effects on open unemployment.  
Elmeskov et al. (1998) used the average of the Layard et al. measure over the 
whole time period studied in order to reduced the problems of simultaneity, whereas   43 
Nickell and Layard (1999) divided ALMP expenditures by the number of unemployed 
persons in an earlier time period. It is noteworthy that both these studies seem to indi-
cate that an expansion of ALMPs raises total unemployment. On the whole, the re-
sults of ALMPs are less favourable when the problem of simultaneity bias is ad-
dressed.  
One should also note that the reported results refer to unemployment as a share of 
the labour force. Our previous discussion indicates that results may be more favour-
able if unemployment is instead measured as a fraction of the population, as ALMPs 
may influence labour force participation positively (see Sections 2.2 and 4.3). Two of 
the studies are consistent with such an effect. Nickell and Layard (1999) did not find 
any significant decreasing effect of ALMPs on employment as a fraction of the popu-
lation at the same time as their results imply an increase in total unemployment as a 
fraction of the labour force. Scarpetta (1996) found that ALMPs contribute to a lower 
share of inactive persons in the population. 
 
6 Conclusions 
Section 6.1 summarises the lessons regarding the various mechanisms through which 
active labour market policy can work and the evidence on net employment effects. 
Section 6.2 draws conclusions on the relative efficiency of various ALMPs. Section 
6.3, finally, makes a tentative evaluation of active labour market policy in Sweden 
and draws some general policy conclusions. 
 
6.1  The various mechanisms of ALMPs 
The empirical studies surveyed highlight the following mechanisms or complexes of 
mechanisms of active labour market policy (see Section 2): (i) effects on the matching 
process and the competition for jobs, as well as on productivity and the allocation  
of labour; (ii) direct crowding-out effects; (iii) effects on the wage pressure in the 
economy, which are the net of the effects on matching efficiency, the 
effects on the competition for jobs, the accommodation effects, the effects of re-
allocation of labour and productivity effects; and (iv) the net effect on regular em-
ployment (and open unemployment). 
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Matching efficiency and the competition for jobs 
The effects on matching efficiency and the competition for jobs are highlighted in 
both microeconomic and macroeconomic studies. These effects are likely to be corre-
lated with the effects on the productivity of job seekers and the allocation of labour 
(to the extent that ALMPs raise the productivity of the participants and re-allocate 
labour from low-demand to high-demand areas, matching efficiency and the competi-
tion for jobs are also likely to increase). On the whole, there is little support for the 
view that the active labour market policy in Sweden in the 1990s had positive effects 
in these respects. 
Macroeconomic studies of geographic mobility seem to imply that ALMPs have 
rather tended to lock in labour. Although the microeconomic studies of the effects of 
labour market training on individuals in the 1980s found positive employment and 
income effects, this does not apply to the 1990s: the studies of the later period have 
instead usually found insignificant or negative effects. There are fewer studies of job 
creation measures, and here the results vary more (see Section 6.2 below). 
The most favourable results for the effects of ALMPs on individuals are obtained 
in survey studies of employer attitudes. But on the other hand, participants in ALMPs 
seem to search less actively for jobs than the openly unemployed. 
There is also some evidence that ALMPs in Sweden may have raised labour force 
participation, which might potentially lead to more competition for jobs. But the 
number of studies is too small to warrant more definite conclusions. There is also the 
question to what extent such a ”registered” increase in labour force participation 




Both survey studies and econometric macro studies indicate that job creation schemes 
have crowded out regular employment to a substantial degree. Labour market training 
does not appear to have had such effects. The direct crowding-out effects are consid-
erably larger in the econometric studies (usually around 60–70 percent) than in the 
survey studies (usually 15–40 percent). 
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Wage pressure 
The effect of ALMPs on wage pressure is the net of a number of effects that work in 
different directions: effects on matching efficiency, competition effects, accommoda-
tion effects, effects on reservation wages and re-allocation effects. A large number of 
Swedish studies of the wage-setting relationship has examined this net effect. The 
results are not clear-cut. Many studies have found that an expansion of ALMPs has 
increased wage pressure. Nearly as many studies have found no significant effect at 
all. Fewer studies have found a wage-reducing effect. The conclusion is that Swedish 
ALMPs are unlikely to have reduced wage pressure, but it is unclear whether they 
have raised wages or had no effect at all. 
The results from the macroeconomic wage-setting studies are consistent with the 
results from the macroeconomic studies of geographical mobility and the majority of 
microeconomic studies of the effects on individual participants discussed in Section 
6.1. If ALMPs do not have positive effects on matching efficiency (mobility) and the 
competition for jobs, they should not be expected to reduce aggregate wage pressure. 
 
The net effect on regular employment and unemployment 
The net effects of ALMPs on (un)employment in Sweden have been studied in mac-
roeconomic estimations of reduced-form equations. Most of the studies imply that an 
expansion of ALMPs reduces open unemployment. But the studies also suggest that 
the sum of direct and indirect crowding-out effects is large. The estimates do not sup-
port the view that an expansion of ALMPs reduces total unemployment (the sum of 
open unemployment and programme participation). Some of the evidence rather sug-
gests the opposite.  
We compared Swedish reduced-form estimations with similar estimations on 
cross-country and panel data for the whole OECD area. The latter studies have often 
been interpreted to give a very favourable picture of the employment effects of 
ALMPs (see e.g. Layard et al., 1991; or Nickell and Layard, 1999). This is, however, 
partly a misunderstanding, which derives from the fact that these studies have usually 
focused on the effect on open unemployment rather than on regular employment or 
total unemployment. If one recalculates the estimates in these studies to effects on 
total unemployment, the effects vary between studies, but the overall picture is similar 
to the one from the Swedish studies. 
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6.2  The relative efficiency of various ALMPs 
What do the studies of Sweden say about the relative efficiency of different pro-
grammes? A first issue concerns labour market training versus job creation. Here, the 
microeconomic studies of effects on individuals and the macroeconomic studies of 
general-equilibrium effects give inconsistent results. The microeconomic studies of 
labour market training in the 1990s found no or negative employment effects. In con-
trast, some studies found positive effects of job creation schemes on later regular 
employment. But in the macroeconomic studies, there is a strong tendency that labour 
market training gives more positive (or less negative) effects on regular employment 
than job creation. Only the latter programmes seem to cause direct crowding-out ef-
fects. 
Another issue concerns the relative efficiency of various job creation programmes. 
The few available microeconomic studies suggest positive employment effects on the 
participating individuals of self-employment grants, recruitment subsidies, work 
placement schemes and trainee replacement schemes, whereas it has proved difficult 
to find such effects of relief work and work experience schemes. But at the same time, 
there is much to suggest that these programmes have large crowding-out effects. Un-
fortunately, there is a strong tendency that the schemes close to regular jobs have both 
positive employment effects for the participating individuals and large negative 
crowding-out effects. 
The empirical studies seem to be the most negative for youth programmes. Here, 
there appear to be large crowding-out effects, at the same time as it is uncertain 
whether there are positive employment effects on the participating individuals. 
 
6.3  Policy conclusions 
Which policy conclusions can be drawn from the unique Swedish experiment in the 
1990s of using large-scale ALMPs to fight high unemployment? Should the Swedish 
policy be followed by other countries in similar circumstances? It is true that enough 
time may not yet have passed to allow a final verdict: this may require an analysis of 
to what extent the rise in unemployment in the early 1990s will lead to persistent ef-
fects, and of whether there are long-term employment effects of ALMPs on labour 
force participation that have not yet worked themselves out. We do not rule out such 
effects. Notwithstanding these caveats, our conclusion is still that the labour market 
policy followed in Sweden in the 1990s was not efficient. The Swedish experience   47 
shows clearly the limitations of ALMPs as a measure to fight unemployment. It is not 
a measure that should be relied on to the extent that was done in Sweden. 
A main problem with ALMPs in Sweden in the 1990s was their size. This applies 
especially to labour market training. It is a problem to expand training programmes 
very rapidly in a situation when the appropriate infrastructure is not there. In such a 
situation, one should expect marginal returns to be decreasing, as is suggested by 
Björklund and Moffitt (1987), who found the average effect on the hourly wage to be 
decreasing with the volume of training. One should also expect training programmes 
to be ineffective in a situation with very low demand, when unemployment duration is 
long under all circumstances, and when it is difficult to know where future labour 
shortages in the economy will appear. The upshot is that training programmes should 
be kept rather small in a deep recession. There is certainly a strong case for not using 
ALMPs (especially training programmes) as an income support measure (either as an 
alternative to unemployment benefits or as a means to re-qualify the participants for 
such benefits) as was done in Sweden, because this is likely both to distort the incen-
tives for programme participation and result in very large programme volumes. 
As to job creation measures, we have pointed to the conflict between positive em-
ployment effects on the participating individuals and the macroeconomic crowding-
out effects. This is a strong argument to target job creation measures on the long-term 
unemployed (and those who are threatened to become long-term unemployed): then 
competition effects may affect regular employment positively, even if there are large 
crowding-out effects. 
Our survey also questions the use of large-scale youth programmes, as they seem 
to have large displacement effects, at the same time as it is unclear whether there are 
any positive employment effects for the participating individuals. Since those who 
have been unemployed for less than six months seem rarely to meet negative em-
ployer attitudes (Klingvall, 1998), there appear to be no strong reasons to place young 
people in programmes during their first half-year of unemployment. This is an argu-
ment for much smaller youth programmes than were used in Sweden in the 1990s. 
One cannot, of course, analyse the proper role of ALMPs without corresponding 
evaluations of alternative policy instruments. Indeed, subjecting only some policies to 
critical scrutiny, but not others, could lead to a worse policy mix. But it is safe to con-
clude that the Swedish strategy of using ALMPs as the main policy instrument to fight 
unemployment in the 1990s was not founded on systematic ex ante knowledge of the   48 
effectiveness of the programmes, and that our ex post evaluation does not support the 
view that they were effective in maintaining regular employment. Rather, the policies 
that were pursued are likely to have reduced open unemployment at the cost of also 
reducing regular employment. It is a value judgement whether one should consider 
this to reduce or increase social welfare. But there is a lot to suggest that the Swedish 
example of the 1990s is not one to follow if one views high regular employment as 
the primary objective of labour market policy.   49 
Appendix 
Many of the studies on data from a large number of OECD countries discussed in 
Section 5 have estimated unemployment equations of the form 
 
..., u + = αγ       ( A 1 )  
where  
 
r/uy b γ r = .       (A2) 
 
u is open unemployment (as a fraction of the labour force), γ  is the measure of 
ALMPs, α is a parameter measuring the effect of ALMPs on open unemployment, br 
is the expenditure on ALMPs per programme participant, r is programme participa-
tion (as a fraction of the labour force) and y is GDP per capita. 
We are interested in computing du/dr and d(u+r)/dr from the estimated models. 















= .      (A3) 
 
To calculate du/dr we need information on br/y. In our calculations we set br/y = 
0.5. This parameter value is motivated in the following way. For Denmark, Finland, 
Norway and Sweden, Zetterberg (1993) provides information on γ. The database col-
lected by Rødseth and Nymoen (1999) gives information on programme participation 
and unemployment for the same countries. As br/y = γu/r, we can compute this ratio. 
The average values for the period 1985 – 91, are 0.41 for Denmark, 0.60 for Finland, 
0.42 for Norway and 0.44 for Sweden. As the effect on unemployment of ALMPs in 
(A3) is increasing in br/y, our guesstimate 0.5 does not seem to imply that we have 
underestimated the effect systematically. Given this assumption, we can compute 
du/dr at given values of open unemployment and programme participation. The effect 
on total unemployment (the sum of programme participation and open unemploy-
ment) is obtained as d(r+u)/dr = 1 + du/dr.   50 
Zetterberg (1993) instead used the ratio between total ALMP expenditures and to-
tal expenditures on the unemployed (see Table 2) as the measure of ALMPs in his 
unemployment equations. This measure, which we label λ, can be written 
) /( u b r b r b u r r + = λ ,      (A4) 
where, in addition to the previously explained variables, bu is the expenditure per 
openly unemployed person. Here, we proceeded by assuming that the spending per 
programme participant equals the spending per openly unemployed, i.e., br = bu. Gi-












      ( A 5 )  
In Table 15 in the text, we have assumed throughout that u = 0.07 and r = 0.03.   51 
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